Code Compliance

Compliance for your codebase.

Connect your GitHub or GitLab. We scan against the regulations you operate under (GDPR, DORA, MiCA, PSD2, AML/CFT) and surface gaps with the rulebook citation, not just the line number. Your code never leaves the ephemeral analysis sandbox.

Code Compliance
1Repositories
11Open findings
7Deterministic
4Needs a person
Zero-access·Ephemeral sandbox·Read-only OAuth·Per-tenant keys
acme/custody-platform
TypeScript · main · last scan 15d ago
Scanning 0%
11 open7 deterministic · 4 heuristic · 0 human review
Re-scanReview findings
acme/custody-platform
TypeScript · main · last scanned 0m ago
11 open
DORA5 open
Art. 9(4)(d)
CriticalDeterministic
Art. 9(2)
Data in transit protected
CriticalDeterministic
Art. 9(4)(d)
Strong authentication and access control
HighDeterministic
MiCA5 open
Art. 75(7)
Client assets never used for own account
CriticalHeuristic
DORA Art. 9(4)(d) · RTS 2024/1774 Art. 7
Cryptographic key management
CriticalFixed in codeVerifiedDeterministic
The production withdrawal signing key is a string literal in source. Your policy requires keys to be generated, stored and rotated inside the key-management lifecycle, never in code.
Your rule: Encryption and Cryptographic Controls Policy · § 5.4  ·  services/withdrawals.ts:11
10// TODO move to KMS before launch11const WITHDRAWAL_SIGNING_KEY = "sk_live_9f2c41e0a7…";11const WITHDRAWAL_SIGNING_KEY = await kms.getKey("withdrawal-signing");12export const signer = new Signer(WITHDRAWAL_SIGNING_KEY);
FixRotate the key now, load it from the KMS or HSM at runtime, and add a pre-commit secret scan so a live key cannot be committed again.
Re-scanning services/withdrawals.ts
Fix detected by scan
commit 4e1a9c · scan 0m ago
Key rotated in KMS
Outside the codebase · needs an attestation
key v2 · attested by Head of IT · 0m ago
Confirm
Added to the audit trail and to the evidence for Encryption and Cryptographic Controls Policy § 5.4
Verify fixOpen fix PR
Open the related policy →
Cited to the rulebook, not just the line11 open

Coverage

What we actually check for.

Frameworks the regulated-finance buyer already operates under, mapped to the patterns we can detect in source. Findings carry the rulebook citation, not a generic CWE, so the engineer reading the report knows exactly what obligation is at stake.

GDPR

Personal-data flow tracing, DSAR handlers, retention-policy presence, hardcoded PII in logs, lawful-basis annotations on processing surfaces.

DORA

Incident-logging hooks, change-management evidence on production-impacting paths, deployment audit trail, ICT third-party call inventory.

MiCA / EMD2

Custody segregation patterns, omnibus-account logic, redemption-rights surfaces, fee disclosure rendering, white-paper-stated-claim consistency.

PSD2 / PSD3

Strong customer authentication implementation, SCA fallback paths, payment-data scope discipline, PSP outsourcing boundary checks.

AML / Sanctions

Transaction-monitoring hooks, sanctions-list call points, KYC trigger placement, travel-rule data completeness on transfer endpoints.

Cross-cutting

Secrets in source, dependency CVEs with regulatory implication, encryption-at-rest correctness, third-party data egress surfaces.

How it works

From connect to cited findings in one cycle.

Same loop on every connect: repeatable, audit-trailed, and scoped tightly enough that the engineer and the compliance officer read the same report.

  1. 01

    Connect

    OAuth into your GitHub or GitLab. Read-only scopes only. We list the repos we have access to; you scope the scan further from there.

  2. 02

    Scan

    Source clones into an ephemeral sandbox. Pattern matching and LLM-grounded reasoning against the rulebook. Sandbox destroyed at completion.

  3. 03

    Review

    Findings ranked by confidence tier, cited to the regulation, linked to the file and line. The same report a compliance officer and a senior engineer can read.

  4. 04

    Remediate

    Suggested fixes: pattern-level for deterministic findings, framework-level for heuristic ones. Re-scan to verify. Audit trail on every cycle.

Security model

Your code never leaves the sandbox.

We lead with the security model because for any serious team it is the product. Four operational guarantees, enforced at the infrastructure layer, not a marketing claim. And because compliance is rarely binary, every finding says how sure the scanner is.

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  • Zero-access architectureComplyBridge staff never read your scanned source. Results are persisted, the source isn't.
  • Ephemeral analysis sandboxCode lands in an isolated sandbox per scan, is analysed in memory, and is destroyed at completion.
  • Read-only OAuth scopesThe minimum read scopes the scanner needs. No write, commit or PR rights without an explicit opt-in.
  • Per-tenant encryption keysKeys never leave your tenant. SOC 2, ISO 27001, and per-jurisdiction data residency for design-partner deployments.
  • Confidence-tiered findingsDeterministic, heuristic, or human review. A CTO triages in seconds; compliance knows what needs legal.
  • Cited to the rulebookEach finding names the obligation and the article, not a generic CWE.

FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Common questions from CTOs and compliance officers.

Will ComplyBridge staff have access to our scanned source code?
No. The analysis sandbox runs scoped to a single repo per scan, results are persisted, the source itself isn't. Engineering staff have read access to the scan logs (for product debugging) but not to the cloned source. Per-tenant encryption keys mean even infrastructure breach scenarios don't expose your code in plaintext.
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How does this differ from Snyk, Semgrep, or SonarQube?
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GitHub or GitLab?
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What size codebase can you scan?
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What's the 'zero-access' claim, exactly?
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Pricing?
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Ready to transform your compliance?

Measure the impact from day one.